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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates the association between the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms and the extent to which multi-
national enterprises build, manage and maintain their networks of tax haven subsidiaries. We extend inter-
nalisation theory and derive a number of hypotheses that are tested using count models on ﬁrm-level data. Our
key ﬁndings demonstrate that there is a strong correlation and causal link between the size of an MNE’s tax
haven network and their use of the Big 4. We therefore argue that public policy related to the role of auditors can
have a signiﬁcant impact on the tax avoidance behaviour of MNEs.
1. Introduction
Given the impact that the recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has had on
the public ﬁnances of developed economies, the use of tax avoidance
measures by multinational enterprises (MNEs) has come under in-
creasing scrutiny from various governments and civil society organi-
sations across the world. High proﬁle cases, such as the tax aﬀairs of
Amazon, Facebook1 and Google have received widespread media at-
tention. Zucman (2015) ﬁnds that 55 percent of the foreign proﬁts of
US ﬁrms are located in tax havens; whilst the Tax Justice Network es-
timates that around 25 percent of US ﬁrms’ global proﬁts are shifted out
of jurisdictions where real economic activity takes place, resulting in a
global revenue loss of around $130 billion a year2 (Cobham& Janský,
2015).
The ‘Big 4′ accountancy ﬁrms Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC, play an
important role not only in the accounting services they provide for
global MNEs, but in the wider provision of ﬁnancial services ranging
from tax advice to company formation. Recently, the leaked Panama
Papers of 2016 revealed the details of thousands of anonymously
owned companies across multiple justiﬁcations. These included ap-
parent PwC entities based in jurisdictions known as tax havens, in-
cluding for example the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Luxembourg and
Mauritius. Apparent KPMG entities were found based in Guernsey,
Hong Kong, Jersey and Switzerland.3 In regards to the Big 4′s role in the
overall tax strategy of MNEs, it is the earlier ‘LuxLeaks’ of November
2014 which has provided a number of clear insights. These documents
showed that PwC assisted MNEs to obtain at least 548 legal but secret
tax rulings in Luxembourg from 2002 to 2010. The rulings allowed
MNEs to channel hundreds of billions of dollars through Luxembourg,
arising from economic activities that took place in other jurisdictions
and with eﬀective tax rates so low that they saved billions of dollars in
taxes. Subsequent leaks showed that Deloitte, EY and KPMG had also
brokered such tax rulings.
The Big 4 also frequently provide advice to governments on the
design of tax policy − sometimes seconding staﬀ to draft laws − and
advocate publicly and privately for particular policy changes, nation-
ally and internationally in fora such as the OECD. As such, they have
both the expertise and inﬂuence by which they may be able to reduce
the eﬀective tax rates of their clients.
This paper therefore, examines the impact that the Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrms have on the extent and complexity of MNEs tax haven
activity for a sample of developed economies. We explain this phe-
nomenon of managing and maintaining a network of tax haven sub-
sidiaries by identifying a set of associated ﬁrm- and country-level de-
terminants, which are based on our theoretical framework that adopts
internalisation theory (Jones and Temouri, 2016; Rugman, 1980; ,
2010). We test our hypotheses on a panel dataset that includes 5912
MNEs from 12 developed countries over the period 2005–2013. Im-
portantly, our data uniquely identiﬁes the number of tax haven sub-
sidiaries each MNE owns annually. This means we can track the entire
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network of tax haven subsidiaries owned and used by each MNE over
the sample period.
Our paper makes a number of key contributions to the literature
both theoretically and empirically. In terms of theory, we extend in-
ternalisation theory to the context of tax havens by adapting Rugman’s
(1981) country-speciﬁc advantage–ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantage (CSA–FSA)
matrix and proposing a pyramid construct that illustrates how an entire
industry develops which allows ﬁrms to avoid and mitigate their tax
bill. We show that the tax services industry, propagated by the Big 4, is
essentially the apex of this pyramid of factors that helps build, manage
and maintain a network of tax haven subsidiaries. In terms of the em-
pirics, our analysis is the ﬁrst to quantify the impact of the Big 4 on
MNEs tax avoidance behaviour by utilising a large ﬁrm-level dataset for
a set of developed economies.4 Hence, we are able to show the extent to
which the utilisation of the Big 4 is associated with MNEs utilising,
managing and maintaining their vast networks of tax haven sub-
sidiaries. Furthermore, our analysis investigates this phenomenon
based on a heterogeneous group of developed countries, in contrast to
previous studies that have mainly focused on US MNEs (Hines & Rice,
1994; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2006a). This makes our ﬁndings much ri-
cher, more robust and allows us to extend ﬁndings by Jones and
Temouri (2016) that analyses tax haven use within the context of the
comparative capitalism literature.
The panel data we have allows us to estimate a number of econo-
metric speciﬁcations using a count-data methodology to investigate the
determinants of the incidence rate of tax haven use by MNEs.
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of our data is used to analyse the
causality between the use of a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm and the extent to
which MNEs utilise tax havens. This is made possible by estimating an
instrumental variables poisson model, using a novel instrument.
Our key ﬁnding is that there is a strong positive correlation between
using a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm for auditing purposes and the extent to
which MNEs build, manage and maintain tax haven networks. As well
as simple correlation, we also present evidence suggestive of causation,
which is based on results demonstrating that MNEs which take on a Big
4 accountancy ﬁrm subsequently increase the size of their tax haven
networks, relative to those ﬁrms which do not take on a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm. Furthermore, we also control for endogeneity and show
further evidence that the Big 4 play an important role in the extent of
tax haven networks.
Highlighting the magnitude of this relationship, our results indicate
that MNEs that utilise one of the Big 4 as their auditor, holding ev-
erything else constant (including ﬁrm size), have an incidence rate of
tax haven use 1.12-1.14 times higher compared to those MNEs that do
not use one of the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms as their auditor.
Furthermore, the growth rate of setting up tax haven subsidiaries is at
least 2.9 percent higher for those MNEs that take on a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm compared to those ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm at all during the sample period.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we
present our theoretical framework from which we derive our hy-
potheses. The subsequent section describes the data, variables and
methodology. The next section presents the results followed by a dis-
cussion that outlines how our ﬁndings impact on policy makers and the
implications for managers of MNEs in terms of strategy. We conclude
with avenues for future research in this area, which we argue is still an
under-researched topic in both the strategic management and interna-
tional business literature.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982;
Rugman, 1981) is the dominant framework in the international busi-
ness literature for explaining why MNEs expand abroad in order to add
value both for themselves and in their host country locations via
technology transfer (Liu &Wang, 2003; Xu, 2000). The key driver of
this process is the existence of transaction costs (Coase, 1937) caused by
market imperfections in both goods and factor markets which force
encourage ﬁrms to create their own internal markets to escape the
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). This line of thinking is directly
transferable to imperfections in capital markets, where MNEs are able
to overcome country-level regulations to create internal capital markets
to ﬁnance their global operations.
The complexity of regulations creates loopholes and mismatches
that enable ﬁrms to exploit diﬀerences across countries. This is
exploited for tax purposes and other motivations for institutional ar-
bitrage such as cross-listing activity of MNEs in multiple markets
(Temouri et al., 2016). For example, Buckley, Sutherland, Voss and El-
Gohari (2015) show how Chinese ﬁrms, using multiple holding com-
pany structures in places like the Cayman Islands, take advantage of tax
haven locations for additional ﬂexibility. Hence, ﬁrms can escape weak
home country institutions. Nevertheless, institutional arbitrage is likely
to be less signiﬁcant for the MNEs included in this study because they
all come from the OECD. We therefore focus on tax minimization as the
key driver of tax haven activity.
The use of transfer pricing via tax havens is perhaps one of the best
examples of this arbitrage opportunity. Tax havens allow MNEs to shift
proﬁts out of high tax locations into low tax locations (Eden, 2009).
They are associated with extremely low (often zero) rates of tax on
corporate proﬁts for non-resident companies and oﬀer a high degree of
secrecy in terms of information exchange that could be used by revenue
authorities to raise tax both at home and in foreign locations.
Jones and Temouri (2016) utilise internalisation theory by applying
Rugman’s (1981) the CSA–FSA matrix to the decision as to whether an
MNE should set up a tax haven subsidiary. They distinguish between
both FSAs and CSAs that enhance the likelihood of MNEs setting up tax
haven subsidiaries. This paper builds on these insights by crucially in-
vestigating, not merely the decision to set up subsidiaries in tax havens,
but to analyse the extent to which MNEs undertake tax haven activity,
as proxied by the size of tax haven networks.
It is widely known that Enron− the notorious energy, commodities
and services company that went into bankruptcy in 2001–had over 800
overseas subsidiaries. Enron is not a unique case. MNEs across the de-
veloped world have vast and complex operations spanning the globe
and many of these operations include subsidiaries speciﬁcally used for
tax purposes. In this context therefore, tax havens allow MNEs to create
what Oxelheim Randøy, and Stonehill (2001) call “ﬁnancial speciﬁc
advantages”. These advantages are certainly non-location bound
(Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) and can be used proactively by MNEs.
Fig. 1 shows our underlying conceptual framework which is re-
presented by a pyramid and is based on what we call the “building
blocks for tax haven intensity”. We argue that both FSAs and CSAs are
critical if ﬁrms are to invest abroad and utilise tax haven subsidiaries
(Jones & Temouri, 2016). Hence, at the base of the pyramid, we show
that FSAs and CSAs are equally as important to one other. Since all
MNEs have some level of FSA which are non-ﬁnancial in nature
(Barney, 1991) and are non-location bound, these can be transferred
abroad and recombined with location bound FSAs to create competitive
advantage (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). Ownership of these FSAs has to
be transferred to tax haven locations in order for MNEs to avoid the
market imperfections caused by the complex international tax code. At
this point MNEs will begin to set up a strategy that aligns their tax
haven subsidiaries with subsidiaries in non-tax haven locations for
three reasons, the ﬁrst of which creates much controversy: (1) in order
to defer or escape corporate tax at home and abroad by creating a wall
4 Lisowsky (2010) using conﬁdential tax shelter and tax return data obtained from the
IRS show a positive relation between ﬁrms using a tax shelter and the use of a Big 5
auditor.
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of secrecy; (2) to act as capital providers for the MNEs group of com-
panies (Altshuler & Grubert, 2003; Hines &Hubbard,1990); and (3) as
captive insurance companies to provide cover for risks not normally
insurable on-shore (Hampton & Christensen, 2002).
In order for MNEs to undertake and maintain tax haven networks,
FSAs are a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition. Equally important
are country-level factors at home and in the host location (the oﬀshore
ﬁnancial centre) which allows the ability of MNEs to create and
maintain complex networks of overseas subsidiaries including their use
for tax avoidance purposes. Jones and Temouri (2016) are the ﬁrst who
link tax haven FDI to the institutional approach of the varieties of ca-
pitalism (VOC) (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke, 2009). Jones and
Temouri (2016) argue that MNEs from countries with a more liberal
market orientation (LME) − Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK
and the US− have a greater propensity of tax haven activity compared
with their peers who have origins in the coordinated market economies
(CMEs) of Austria, Germany, Japan and the Nordics. Jones and Temouri
(2016) argue that this is based on the following factors: (1) path-de-
pendency, that is, economic geography linked to colonial history, legal
origin and a common language; (2) ﬁnancial risk concerning the choice
between equity ﬁnancing versus debt ﬁnancing; and (3) governance
factors, and in particular co-determination whereby the rights of
workers are enshrined in legislation that make it more likely that they
have a presence at the board level. Given the fact that these factors
impact upon a ﬁrm’s decision to set up tax haven subsidiaries, they
therefore must also impact upon the extent to which ﬁrms undertake
this activity.
Finally, the apex of the pyramid represents the combination of FSAs
and CSAs. Rugman (2010) argues that this conﬁguration demonstrates
how both ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc factors co-evolve to explain pat-
terns of overseas FDI, which in essence is simply the eclectic paradigm
(Dunning, 1977, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000). Crucially, this is directly
applicable to tax haven FDI. Indeed, at the apex of the pyramid, it is
easy to think of an entire industry developing for tax avoidance pur-
poses. This would include the creation of consultancy ﬁrms that oﬀer
advice on tax avoidance measures. Maydew and Shackelford (2005)
discuss the evolution of this industry, and one of the main roles of the
Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms is enabling MNEs to avoid corporate tax across
their subsidiary network. It is notable that all of the Big 4 international
accountancy ﬁrms were founded in either the UK or the US and that
three out of the four (PwC, Deloitte and EY) have headquarters in these
two countries. Consequently, the ability to take advantage of the ser-
vices oﬀered by the Big 4 is in itself an FSA that is built upon the
regulatory environment constructed in both home and host country
locations.
The dichotomy between CSAs and FSAs is a natural modelling fra-
mework to adopt, as it highlights the country-level and ﬁrm-level
factors that determine the extent of tax haven FDI. In addition, it lends
itself to the ﬁrm-level data that we use to test our hypotheses, which we
will now discuss in more detail to motivate the conceptual framework
presented in Fig. 1. We focus ﬁrst on the main theoretical contribution
of this paper − the apex of the pyramid.
2.1. The role of the Big 4: the apex of the pyramid
Our major theoretical insight concerns the apex of the pyramid that
helps link together the FSAs and CSAs that result in the widespread use
and the resulting rationale for utilising tax haven subsidiaries to avoid
corporate tax. Given the hostile press coverage of the Big 4 for their
perceived compliance in the tax avoidance industry, it is surprising that
the academic literature has to a large degree neglected their role.5 The
few exceptions are Sikka (2010, 2013) and Sikka and Hampton (2005)
who discuss in signiﬁcant detail the role that the Big 4 have played in
the sales and marketing activity of various tax avoidance schemes.
However, much of their analysis is case based, and although in-
formative, lacks the rigour of a large ﬁrm-level based empirical analysis
which is necessary in an attempt to generalise such case based ﬁndings.
This paper takes a signiﬁcant step to addressing this absence.
The UK Parliaments Public Accounts Committee report (2015) on
Tax Avoidance and the Role of the Large Accountancy Firms identiﬁes a
long-standing concern about MNEs avoiding tax and the role that tax
advisors play. In particular, it singles out PwC since the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists published a series of documents
showing that PwC had negotiated advanced tax rulings for many hun-
dreds of companies with the Luxembourg tax authorities. At a com-
mittee hearing, PwC’s Head of Tax was adamant that the ﬁrm does not
market tax avoidance schemes but conceded that the ﬁrm does create
schemes tailored for individual clients. The committee took a diﬀerent
view and stated that there is ‘no clarity about the boundary between
acceptable tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning’. Furthermore,
the committee report also states that although PwC provides tax advice
to clients in line with an internal Code of Conduct, ‘PwC’s Code does
little more than shroud the way PwC exploits ﬂaws in international tax
law to devise and oﬀer aggressive tax avoidance schemes to its clients.’
The fact that these issues are so newsworthy at present is very sig-
niﬁcant, given the fact that there have been signiﬁcant regulatory-
driven changes to improve the governance over non-audit services
provided by auditors (Dhaliwal, Gal-Or, Naiker, & Sharma, 2013). In-
deed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that before an auditor is retained
to perform tax services, an audit client must seek and obtain approval
from the audit committee. Although the regulations encourage ﬁrms
not to use the tax services of their auditor, due to various conﬂicts of
interest, it is still not illegal. Consequently, it is not surprising that ﬁrms
like to use the same professional service network to provide tax advice
as well as to perform the ﬁrm’s audit. According to Maydew and
Shackelford (2005) this is driven by the fact that audit ﬁrms essentially
become insiders, specialising in the ﬁrm’s industry and gaining access
to a ﬁrm’s internal ﬁnancial information. Furthermore, the auditor ty-
pically has a close working relationship with both the tax director and
the chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer − both of whom may have started their ca-
reers with the accounting ﬁrm that undertakes the audit.
Maydew and Shackelford (2005) show fascinating dynamics within
the audit/tax consultancy industry since the introduction of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act. They ﬁnd that in 2001, S & P 500 ﬁrms paid their
auditors approximately the same fees for audit work as for tax advice
work. However, this had completely changed by 2004, when the fees to
audit were four times higher than to tax. Intriguingly, over the same
period, the tax practices of the largest accounting ﬁrms held steady, so
this indicates that clients are just switching provider as opposed to
Fig. 1. The building blocks for tax haven intensity.
5 An exception being Bankman (2004) who states that many of the largest alleged tax
shelters are developed by the largest accounting ﬁrms.
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reducing the amount of tax advice they receive. Clearly the Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrms have a strong presence in the tax consultancy business.
Indeed, Maydew and Shackelford (2005) argue that they have a strong
advantage over law ﬁrms due to their global footprint, ability to crunch
the numbers and the fact that the ﬁnancial reporting perspectives of
accountants have helped shape corporate tax planning.
Additional academic literature shows that auditors were paid sig-
niﬁcant fees to devise abusive tax strategies (see Beale, 2004; Bryan-
Low, 2004; Drucker, 2006; SEC, 2006). Donohoe and Knechel (2014)
using a compound measure of long-run eﬀective tax rates ﬁnd a positive
association between tax aggressiveness and audit fees. Mills (1998) ﬁnd
that eﬀective tax rates are decreasing in tax-related fees paid to attor-
neys, accountants and consultants; whilst McGuire, Omer and Wang
(2012) show that ﬁrms purchasing non-audit services from their ex-
ternal audit ﬁrm engage in greater tax avoidance when the external
audit ﬁrm is a tax expert. Furthermore, Dhaliwal et al. (2013) ﬁnd a
strong positive association between tax avoidance and tax planning
non-audit services. They argue that their results suggest that accounting
experts believe that auditor-provided tax planning services are an ap-
propriate means of reducing income taxes. In addition, Hogan and Noga
(2015) demonstrate an economically and statistically signiﬁcant, ne-
gative relationship between levels of auditor-provided tax services
(APTS) and the long-term eﬀective tax rate: that is, the more tax ser-
vices a company receives from its auditor, the lower its eﬀective tax
rate. Finally, Chyz, Gal-Or, and Naiker (2016) ﬁnd that there are im-
portant diﬀerences in the eﬀects on both tax avoidance and audit oﬃce
culture when they distinguish between tax planning services and tax
compliance services.
While our data provide a bigger sample than previous studies, the
limitation that only audit ﬁrms can be identiﬁed is an important one,
because of the apparent diﬀerences in the eﬀects of the Big 4 when they
hold diﬀerent roles. However, we do not think that this is a signiﬁcant
problem due to the fact that an auditor has to sign oﬀ on a ﬁrm’s ac-
counts, thereby giving credibility to an MNE’s corporate structure.
Klassen, Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) focus speciﬁcally on the role of
the signatory on corporate tax returns, distinguishing between whether
this is the auditor, an external non-auditor, or the company’s internal
tax department. Among other ﬁndings, the authors look at ﬁlings with a
Big 4 signatory, and identify a higher degree of tax aggressiveness when
that signature is not provided in the capacity of auditor. Thus, there is
some evidence linking auditor-provided tax services to avoidance ac-
tivity. Whilst these studies provide evidence of the link between audit
ﬁrms and the incentive to provide tax avoidance schemes, they do not
speciﬁcally demonstrate a link between the use of a Big 4 audit by an
MNE and the extent to which the same MNE uses tax haven sub-
sidiaries. Given the prevalence of tax havens in avoidance structures,
and the dominance of the Big 4 in such tax services, this suggests a link
between using a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm and the extent of the network
of tax havens. This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. MNEs audited by the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms are more likely to
build, manage and maintain a larger tax haven subsidiary network in
comparison with MNEs that do not use the Big 4 to audit their accounts.
Although hypothesis 1 is suggestive of a positive association be-
tween the use of a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm and the extent of a MNEs tax
haven network, it is not suﬃcient enough to demonstrate a causal link.
It is plausible that large MNEs need to utilise the advanced capabilities
of the Big 4 ﬁnancial services ﬁrms in order to audit their accounts and
to provide technical advice concerning corporate taxation. Indeed,
studies show that Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms may provide better quality
audits (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998;
Francis &Wang, 2008; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks, 1999). The rules
on corporate taxation are extremely complicated and vary across
countries; depreciation allowances, R & D subsidies, rules concerning
interest deductions and the technical rules based on the various
methods of transfer pricing techniques can all be utilised by ﬁrms to
reduce eﬀective tax rates. Hence, one can argue that it is the MNE that
is the driver of its degree of tax avoidance (the eﬀective tax rate
chosen), whereas the auditor is simply meeting its client’s demand and
providing services in order to maintain its on-going relationship with
the MNE. Hence, this line of argument would suggest that the auditor
should not be seen as the key driver of this type of activity.
However, MNEs do not take decisions about tax haven use in iso-
lation. As intermediaries, there exist a number of complex schemes that
accountancy ﬁrms help MNEs to shift proﬁts to low tax jurisdictions. In
this sense, the Big 4 stand out, since they may not only provide tech-
nical support and conﬁrmation of tax strategies, helping MNEs to na-
vigate the regulatory environment, but are often also the creators and
vendors of particular strategies. Furthermore, they also have a presence
through their global networks in many, if not all, tax havens around the
world, which smaller rival accountancy ﬁrms cannot match. To resolve
this ambiguity in the literature, our empirical analysis allows us to test
fora causal link. Hence, this leads to our second hypothesis:
H2. The growth rate of an MNE’s tax haven network is enhanced via the
use of a Big 4 ﬁrm.
It is important to note that this paper does not focus on the initial
decision to set up a tax haven subsidiary. Setting up a subsidiary in an
oﬀshore location is a trivial exercise and can be executed by a ﬁrm’s
own accounts department. Indeed, there are a multitude of websites
that provide this service for minimal fees. Rather, this paper is about
the extent of the subsidiary network and its complexity as measured by
the growth rate of tax haven subsidiaries.6 Hence, if our analysis ﬁnds
that the extent of a ﬁrm’s oﬀshore network increases after the ﬁrm
adopts a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm, one can conclude that there is an
apparent causal link. This can be operationalised by utilising a sample
of MNEs that includes a subset of ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm and a subset of MNEs that take on a Big 4 accountancy
ﬁrm during the sample period of investigation.
2.2. FSAs
As well as the apex of the pyramid which is our key contribution, it
is also important to consider and control for FSAs and CSAs that may
have an impact. In their seminal article, Prahalad and Hamel (1990)
emphasise the importance of higher order FSAs. These include ‘core
competencies’ such as the ﬁrm’s routines and recombination cap-
abilities, the ability to synchronise and integrate multiple technologies
and furthermore to manage the abilities of employees (i.e. the compe-
tence carriers). If these core competencies are built more quickly than
those of their rivals, and at lower average costs, then ﬁrms can derive
signiﬁcant competitive advantage. Indeed, management of these core
competencies is what Prahalad and Hamel (1990) call the construction
of a ﬁrm’s ‘strategic architecture’. In order to obtain as much value as
possible from this core activity, ﬁrms will use ﬁnancial mechanisms,
such as tax havens, to extract as much value as possible in order to
create further competitive advantage. Clearly, many core competencies
are location bound (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003) and it is diﬃcult to
transfer ownership of these assets across borders, but other assets such
as the acquisition of patents, research and development (R & D) facil-
ities and trademarks can be transferred in a number of ways. Indeed,
one might argue that the ability of a MNE to undertake this type of
activity is itself a form of FSA.7 Oxelheim et al. (2001) speciﬁcally argue
6 Another context may help to explain our research strategy and that is tobacco con-
sumption. The factors that impact upon an adolescent’s decision to start smoking diﬀer to
the factors that cause addiction to frequent tobacco consumption. Hence the decision to
set up a tax haven subsidiary is unlikely to be initially instigated by a Big 4 ﬁrm as it is so
easy to set up in an oﬀshore location. However, the use of a Big 4 ﬁrm is needed as the
degree of oﬀshore complexity increases. The Enron aﬀair being a classic example.
7 See Desai (2009) for an excellent discussion as to how MNEs are redeﬁning their
homes by unbundling activities across borders.
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that ﬁnancial ownership advantages via what they term ‘ﬁnancial
blueprints’ give MNEs an ability to reap the rewards of investments in a
tax haven location.
Fig. 2 demonstrates a complex proﬁt-shifting structure known as the
notorious ‘Double Irish–Dutch Sandwich’ that involves the use of mul-
tiple tax haven subsidiaries and non-tax haven subsidiaries across the
world. Indeed, this type of scheme motivates why the number of tax
haven subsidiaries is of signiﬁcance. The more subsidiaries there are the
more layers of complexity and secrecy that a ﬁrm’s tax haven network is
likely to encompass. Furthermore, the additional complexity makes it
harder for the revenue authorities to track them. Examples of compa-
nies that have used structures like this include Apple, Facebook, Google
and Microsoft. The structure essentially works as follows. A US parent
MNE transfers its intellectual property to an Irish-incorporated com-
pany A which is resident oﬀshore in the tax haven Bermuda. Company
A then sublicenses the intellectual property to a company tax resident
in the Netherlands. The Dutch company then sublicenses the in-
tellectual property to an Irish Company B tax resident in Ireland. This
subsidiary is itself wholly owned by the Irish company registered in
Bermuda. Irish company B then sublicenses the intellectual property to
subsidiaries around the world in non-tax haven locations. The royalty
ﬂows between all of these subsidiaries ensure that corporate tax is
avoided across multiple locations and proﬁts are shifted to Bermuda
where the corporate tax rate is very low or zero. Clearly this process is
complicated and this is just the tip of the iceberg. In practice, the
schemes used by MNEs use layers of complexity that make the tracking
of royalty payments by the tax authorities almost impossible. Further-
more, this is aided by an entire industry that has developed to admin-
ister this process.
There are two main strands in the academic literature that focus on
the role of intangibles, such as R & D and trademarks, in terms of the
likelihood of ﬁrms to utilise tax havens. The ﬁrst strand includes a
number of survey papers that present various case studies and bivariate
statistics. Sikka and Willmott (2010) discuss a number of cases across
diﬀerent industries where MNEs have taken advantage of proﬁt shifting
schemes via the use of transfer pricing. They describe in detail the
Enron aﬀair but also identify cases involving GlaxoSmithKline and
Honda. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) ﬁnd, using univariate
analysist that the more R &D-intensive ﬁrms are, the more likely they
are in using tax avoidance schemes. Finally, Seabrooke and Wigan
(2014) discuss tax avoidance within the context of what they call
‘wealth chains’. They discuss the problems associated with collecting
tax from ﬁrms that have a strong digital presence.
The second strand of literature deals with econometric evidence.
Studies by Desai et al. (2006a), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Taylor,
Richardson, and Taplin, (2015) and Jones and Temouri (2016) all ﬁnd
consistent evidence that R & D and/or the size of a ﬁrm’s intangible to
total assets are key drivers of tax avoidance, be it through measures of
transfer pricing aggressiveness or the incidence of the use of tax haven
subsidiaries. This is the case when analysing both US ﬁrms and MNEs
from other developed countries.
We build on these studies by testing whether FSAs impact on the
extent of tax haven use and not just the dichotomous choice as to
whether a ﬁrm uses tax havens or not (see Jones & Temouri, 2016;
Taylor, Richardson, & Lanis, 2015). We operationalise this by including
in our empirical model the level of intangible assets to total assets.
Intangible assets are deﬁned as items in the balance sheet that are non-
physical in nature, such as formation expenses, research expenses
(other intellectual property such as patents, trademarks, copyrights),
goodwill, development expenses and all other expenses with a long
term eﬀect. It also includes advertising expenditure and training of
employees. As a concept and explanatory variable, it has been widely
used in the previous literature, such as Contractor, Yang and Gaur
(2016) and Filatotchev and Piesse (2011). Thus, we would expect the
ratio of intangible assets to total assets to have a positive eﬀect on the
extent of a MNE’s tax haven subsidiary network. This leads to our third
hypothesis
H3. The extent of an MNE’s network of tax haven subsidiaries is
positively associated with the value of its intangible assets relative to
total assets.
2.3. CSAs
As outlined above in the conceptual framework, it is not suﬃcient
for MNEs to only have FSAs if they are to make use of tax haven sub-
sidiaries. Country-level factors or CSAs are crucial at the institutional
level from both the perspective of the home country, from where the
FDI originates, and the host country where FDI is received. It is well
known that institutions matter in a number of diﬀerent settings (Allen,
2001; Havrylyshyn, 2003). The international business literature shows
in detail how MNEs adapt their strategy to the institutional voids that
surround and impact upon them (Khanna & Palepu, 2006: 62). In con-
trast, the political science literature is concerned with the VOC
(Hall & Soskice, 2001) of a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation and views
the ﬁrm as being embedded alongside other agents and stakeholders, be
they households, business groups or public policy makers. Firms are
seen as relational, seeking to construct and exploit their core compe-
tencies and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2009). As Jones and Temouri
(2016) point out, diﬀerences in the institutional framework across
countries generate systematic diﬀerences in management strategy.
Furthermore, variation across countries is seen as giving ﬁrms a distinct
comparative institutional advantage. The complementarities between
the ﬁrm and its environment essentially determine the extent to which a
political economy is, or is not, ‘coordinated’ (Hancke, 2009).
The VOC literature distinguishes between LMEs and CMEs. The
LMEs are characterised by extreme hierarchical competition, arms-
length trading and the use of formal contracts to settle business trans-
actions. In contrast, CMEs are characterised by group level decision
making via non-market relationships, informal and incomplete con-
tracting, network collaboration and strategic interaction. Jones and
Temouri (2016) are the ﬁrst that utilise this approach in the interna-
tional business literature and link it to the likelihood of MNEs using tax
haven subsidiaries. The absence of widespread adoption of this ap-
proach is surprising given the fact it is such a useful theoretical lens
with which to compare how ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries adjust to similar
pressures in order to explore the extent to which institutional diﬀer-
ences aﬀect strategy (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Given these common
pressures of globalisation on MNEs, it seems natural to adopt this ap-
proach and analyse the extent of tax haven use by MNEs beyond the
question of whether MNEs do or do not use them.
There are various reasons as to why MNEs from the LMEs of
Fig. 2. The Double Irish–Dutch Sandwich.
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Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US are likely to have
greater levels of complexity in terms of tax haven network of sub-
sidiaries compared with MNEs from the CMEs of Austria, Japan,
Germany and the Nordics. One of the key factors is economic geography
and hence path-dependency. Vlcek (2008) and Haberly and Wójcik
(2015) discuss the symbiotic relationship between oﬀshore FDI and its
link between current and former colonies. The UK has clear links with
many of these oﬀshore jurisdictions (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux,
2010) and in many ways the City of London has played a singular role
in receiving funds from the UK’s Overseas Territories and Crown De-
pendencies, and often in lobbying against stronger regulation.
Another institutional diﬀerence between LMEs and CMEs that may
impact upon the extent to which MNEs utilise oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres
is linked to the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms. MNEs incorporated in CMEs
are more likely to rely on patient capital (Deeg, 2009) in the form of
debt. Indeed, ﬁnancing may be generated in business groups and be
dependent upon long-run considerations in contrast to the comparative
short-run share-price maximisation goals of MNEs located in LMEs.
Indeed, this factor highlights the role that corporate governance may
play in these decisions. In the German model of capitalism, co-de-
termination ensures that the rights of workers are represented on the
board of directors. Presumably, the use of tax havens runs counter to
the interests of workers and business groups in general because an
eroding tax base may undermine the industrial relations and funding of
vocational training so commonplace in the German system. Further-
more, the burden of tax is likely to fall on immobile factors as capital
leaks out of a country (Harberger, 1962). Consequently, it is not en-
tirely surprising that German Chancellor Angela Merkel took such a
strong stance over the ﬁnancial crisis in Cyprus given that the country is
notable for its banking model with links to widespread tax avoidance
and evasion. Hence in this paper, we are also able to extend Jones and
Temouri (2016) by examining whether the ﬁrm’s institutional context,
as proxied for by the VOC, impacts upon the extent or complexity of a
MNEs tax haven network and not just upon its decision to set up a tax
haven subsidiary. This leads to our fourth and ﬁnal hypothesis:
H4. MNEs incorporated in LMEs will utilise tax haven subsidiaries to a
greater extent than MNEs from CMEs.
3. Data, variables, and empirical model
The data for this paper are drawn from ORBIS, which is a ﬁrm-level
database. It is provided by Bureau van Dijk, a leading electronic pub-
lisher of annual accounts information for ﬁrms in many countries. We
download consolidated accounts data for every MNE (from 12 ad-
vanced OECD countries) which have a subsidiary in at least one tax
haven location8 and have more than ﬁve employees.9 We use the
conventional way of deﬁning an MNE, namely as a ﬁrm that owns at
least 10 percent in at least one subsidiary located abroad (UNCTAD,
2013).10
One of the key advantages of using ORBIS is that it allows us to
identify the location of every MNE’s foreign subsidiaries,11 including
tax haven locations, which we use to construct our dependent variable.
Thus, our data identify the number of tax haven subsidiaries an MNE
owns on an annual basis. This means we can track the whole network of
tax haven subsidiaries across ﬁrms and across time. This is achieved by
going through earlier releases and archived information of the database
to verify and update the time-varying nature of the number of tax haven
subsidiaries over the sample period. This is a signiﬁcant advancement
upon work by Jones and Temouri (2016) who only identify ﬁrms that
use tax haven subsidiaries in the last year of their panel and extrapolate
backwards assuming that the information is constant over the time. In
total, we have 5912 MNEs over the time period 2005–2013, which
results in an unbalanced panel dataset of 24,781 observations.
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the MNE’s country of origin. In total
there are 3259 MNEs from LMEs and 2653 MNEs from CMEs. Generally,
the trend of larger economies is well represented, such that more ﬁrms
are observed in the UK and the US in the LME category and Germany
and Japan in the CME category. In terms of distribution across in-
dustries, apart from Canada, the other countries show more ﬁrms in the
secondary and tertiary sectors compared with the primary sector.
Table 1
Distribution of MNE country of origin, tax haven presence and industry spread.
Primary sector Manufacturing sector Services sector
Country Number of
MNEs
% of
sample
Number of
MNEs
Mean number of tax haven
subsidiaries per MNE (s.d.)
Number of
MNEs
Mean number of tax haven
subsidiaries per MNE (s.d.)
Number of
MNEs
Mean number of tax haven
subsidiaries per MNE (s.d.)
Liberal market economies
Australia 375 6.34 25 4.88 (7.33) 170 4.07 (10.94) 180 5.19 (10.74)
Canada 302 5.11 95 2.68 (2.88) 143 2.87 (3.48) 64 4.05 (9.17)
New Zealand 30 0.51 3 5.68 (4.42) 11 3.22 (3.12) 16 3.02 (1.96)
UK 1345 22.75 65 8.68 (18.90) 255 3.39 (6.91) 1025 6.04 (21.44)
US 1207 20.42 25 15.86 (26.15) 630 10.88 (23.12) 552 10.77 (30.69)
Coordinated market economies
Austria 182 3.08 2 4.55 (3.80) 61 2.19 (2.74) 119 2.48 (5.56)
Germany 850 14.38 5 1.59 (0.85) 335 4.15 (9.62) 510 2.64 (7.41)
Japan 467 7.90 3 43.5 (25.42) 304 6.12 (12.96) 160 6.55 (12.78)
Denmark 386 6.53 2 1.40 (0.55) 98 2.55 (3.16) 286 3.85 (9.59)
Finland 137 2.32 1 2.00 (0.00) 48 3.13 (3.69) 88 4.89 (8.77)
Norway 219 3.70 18 4.39 (4.30) 44 3.80 (8.39) 157 3.15 (7.15)
Sweden 412 6.97 5 1.76 (1.05) 143 2.75 (4.77) 264 2.42 (6.05)
Total 5912 100 249 2242 3421
8 In our view there is a diﬀerence between the choice to use tax havens (i.e. a 1 versus
zero dichotomous choice) and the extent (i.e. a continuous choice) to which they are used
− which is our primary focus. Hence our focus is on the intensive margin as opposed to
the extensive margin. A simple analogy would be in terms of analysing the factors that
encourage an individual to start smoking. These would diﬀer compared to the factors that
determine the level of tobacco consumption by an individual who is already addicted to
tobacco.
9 We use the threshold of more than ﬁve employees in order to exclude MNEs which are
themselves “shell” companies for tax purposes.
10 We exclude MNEs if their only foreign subsidiary is in a tax haven. In practice there
are very few MNEs that we have to exclude due to this.
11 It is important to note that all tax haven subsidiaries are 100 percent fully owned by
the parent. All other subsidiaries could have ownership percentages less than 100 percent.
This means that the other subsidiaries could be wholly owned, majority owned and
minority owned. The other subsidiaries are useful when constructing one of the ex-
planatory variables: the number of non-tax haven subsidiaries. This is essentially a
measure of internationalisation.
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3.1. Dependent variable: measuring tax haven networks
Our dependent variable is the number of tax haven subsidiaries that
each MNE has in each year of the sample period 2005–2013. It is im-
portant to note that the collection of the whole history of MNE-sub-
sidiary ownership for each MNE has allowed us to construct the time
variant number of tax haven subsidiaries. This oﬀers an ideal test bed
for analysing the relationship between tax haven networks and our
various ﬁrm and country level determinants.
In order to deﬁne which subsidiary locations are in tax havens one
could use a number of diﬀerent lists available. Hines and Rice (1994)
and Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b) distinguish between what are
known as ‘dot tax havens’ and the Big 7 (Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon,
Liberia, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland). Dot tax havens are no-
tably small island economies, whilst the Big 7 had populations in 2013
exceeding 2 million. For this paper we adopt a strategy that lies in
between both of these approaches as including just dot tax havens
means important haven locations such as Switzerland are excluded.
Clearly many of these lists are somewhat arbitrary, and those of
international organisations such as the IMF and OECD are in addition
subject to heavy political pressure (hence they might be systematically
biased) − making it diﬃcult, for example, to name major powers.
Instead, we base our deﬁnition on the Tax Justice Network’s Financial
Secrecy Index (FSI) which replaces the binary division of tax havens
versus all others, with the notion of a secrecy spectrum on which all
jurisdictions sit (see Cobham, Janský, &Meinzer, 2015). On the basis of
49 objectively veriﬁable variables, largely drawn from the work of in-
ternational organisations, 15 secrecy indicators are constructed. These
capture a range of issues from bank secrecy to the transparency of
company accounts and ownership, from administrative cooperation to
international exchange of ﬁnancial information. The 15 indicators are
aggregated into a single secrecy score, which places each jurisdiction on
that spectrum from zero (complete ﬁnancial transparency) to 100
(complete secrecy).
For the FSI’s global ranking, this score is combined with a scale
weighting, so that the overall FSI value reﬂects the potential impact of
each jurisdiction’s secrecy− so that, for example, the US’s score of 60 is
weighted more highly than Nauru’s score of 79. Here we are concerned
not with the global impact of jurisdictions, but the degree of openness
to abuse. For this reason, we take the secrecy score rather than the FSI
value as the basis to identify jurisdictions of concern (which for ease,
we continue to label as ‘tax havens’ although the term ‘secrecy jur-
isdictions’ is in many ways more appropriate).
In the list for 2013, there is a natural cut oﬀ equal to 65, above
which almost all haven locations appear to be situated. Therefore, we
take advantage of this cut-oﬀ and deﬁne the following countries as tax
haven locations: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Barbados, Barbuda, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, British Virgin Islands,
Brunei Darussalam, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Curacao, Cyprus,
Dominica, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala, Guernsey, Hong
Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Macao, Macedonia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco,
Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore,
Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands, UAE, Uruguay, and Vanuatu.
In practice, although the approach we have taken is more scientiﬁc
than just including countries reported by the OECD and the other studies,
our classiﬁcation does not diﬀer substantially from other studies. Table 2
shows that each MNE has on average 6 tax haven subsidiaries with a high
standard deviation of nearly 17. Furthermore, as can be seen referring
back to Table 1, there is clear variability across countries in terms of the
average number of tax haven subsidiaries. It would appear that MNEs from
LMEs have a higher number of tax haven subsidiaries compared with those
countries from the CMEs. In contrast, there is no clear discernible pattern
across sectors. It would appear that MNEs from the primary, secondary
and tertiary sectors all utilise tax havens to a certain extent.Ta
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3.2. Big 4 audit coverage
ORBIS provides data on each ﬁrm’s auditor on a yearly basis. This
allows us to identify which MNEs are audited by the Big 4 accountancy
ﬁrms: Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PwC. The coverage varies
across jurisdiction for our sample. One might think that almost all large
MNEs would be audited by the Big 4 but this is certainly not the case. In
terms of the proportion of ﬁrms who use a Big 4 auditor in our sample,
the Big 4 have a much lower presence in Austria, Germany and Sweden
(18, 36 and 38 percent, respectively) and a slightly higher presence in
Finland, Canada and Australia (48, 53 and 55 percent, respectively). In
contrast, higher rates of Big 4 presence are observed in our sample for
Denmark (61 percent), the UK (67 percent), Norway (68 percent) and
the United States (71 percent). Interestingly, the Big 4 presence for
Japanese MNEs is 81 percent and almost all of New Zealand’s MNEs
that are included in the panel are audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm.
Table 2 also outlines other descriptive statistics for our measure of a
Big 4 presence. As can be seen, on average 66 percent of MNEs utilise a
Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm across the whole panel. In terms of unique
auditor coverage, 18 percent of the MNEs use Ernst & Young, 17 percent
use PwC and KPMG whilst 14 percent use Deloitte.
As our sample is dynamic in nature with respect to auditor adoption,
Table 2 also shows that 10 percent of MNEs start employing a Big 4
accountancy ﬁrm at some point during the sample period, while 5
percent of MNEs decide to employ a non-Big 4 auditor after having
previously employed a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm. Furthermore, 57 per-
cent of MNEs retain their Big 4 aﬃliation throughout the whole sample
period; whilst 26 percent use an auditor that is not one of the Big 4
ﬁrms.
3.3. Explanatory variables
The other explanatory variables used in our analysis are all collected
from annual accounts data for each MNE contained in ORBIS. Annual
turnover is used to capture the size of the MNE. The age of the MNE is
calculated by using the date of incorporation. The ratio of intangible
ﬁxed assets to total assets is used to proxy the level of FSAs in each
MNE. Since we make a distinction between tax haven and non-tax
haven locations, we include the total number of non-tax haven sub-
sidiaries as another measure of the size of the foreign network that an
MNE manages.
We rely on Hall and Gingerich (2004) and Jones and Temouri
(2016) with regard to the distinction between LME and CME countries.
We adopt their empirical analysis which includes the construction of
two indices based on labour relations and corporate governance and
then estimates a regression model between the two. On their plot, the
upward sloping regression line reﬂects the degree to which countries
can be classiﬁed as coordinated. They argue that there is a clear clus-
tering pattern between nations, such that LMEs can be found in the
southwest quadrant and CMEs can be found in the northeast quadrant.
Among the nations included, the US and the UK appear as ‘pure’ LMEs,
whilst Canada, New Zealand and Australia diverge ‘by virtue of systems
of corporate governance in which market co-ordination is not fully
developed’ (Hall & Gingerich, 2004, p. 459). In contrast, Austria, Ger-
many, Japan, Denmark, Finland and Norway lie above the line of best
ﬁt (Sweden lies just slightly below), indicating ‘high levels of strategic
co-ordination in both their labour and ﬁnancial markets’
(Hall & Gingerich, 2004, p. 459). We take a conservative approach
when deﬁning which countries to include in our sample. It seems quite
clear that Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US can be
classiﬁed as LMEs. Thus, MNEs that are incorporated in these countries
are coded with a 1 in our data. In order to deﬁne CMEs, we include
Austria, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and
code MNEs incorporated in these countries with a zero.
We use the NACE two-digit industry codes as deﬁned by Eurostat to
identify the industry in which each MNE operates. Table 3 shows a
detailed description of each of the explanatory variables described
above. All monetary values are deﬂated using GDP deﬂators to take
account of inﬂation. Furthermore, the correlation matrix reported in
Table 2 shows that most of the correlations between explanatory vari-
ables are weak, and a series of VIF calculations generated estimates
below 2.5. Hence multicollinearity is not a problem.
3.4. Empirical model
Since our dependent variable is a count of the number of tax haven
subsidiaries, we test our ﬁrst hypotheses using a series of count data
models (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2013) applied to panel data. In the
main text we report the results utilising the random eﬀects poisson
estimator and as a robustness check we report results using a negative
Table 3
Variables and measures.
Variable Measures Range
No. of THS The total number of subsidiaries that each MNE has located in the tax havens identiﬁed above 1 to 416
Log turnover The natural logarithm of turnover. Turnover is listed in the proﬁt and loss statement/income statement and is deﬁned as total operating
revenue (net sales + other operating revenue + stock variations). These ﬁgures do not include VAT or excise taxes or similar obligatory
payments
Positive
Age The age of an MNE calculated since the year the company was incorporated Positive
IATA Intangible assets divided by total assets. Intangible assets include expenditure such as formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill,
development expenses and all other expenses with a long term eﬀect
0 to 1
No. of non-THS The total number of foreign subsidiaries, excluding tax haven subsidiaries, identiﬁed for the parent ﬁrm 1 to 1896
VOC Dummy variable which equals 1 if an MNE is incorporated in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK or the US and zero if an MNE is
incorporated in Austria, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden
0 to 1
Big 4 Dummy variable indicating whether an MNE has a Big 4 auditor at any time during the sample period 0 to 1
PwC Dummy variable indicating whether an MNE employs PwC as their auditor 0 to 1
EY Dummy variable indicating whether an MNE employs Ernst and Young as their auditor 0 to 1
KPMG Dummy variable indicating whether an MNE employs KPMG as their auditor 0 to 1
Deloitte Dummy variable indicating whether an MNE employs Deloitte as their auditor 0 to 1
Always Big 4 Dummy variable indicating that an MNE has employed one of the Big 4 during the entire sample period 0 to 1
Never Big 4 Dummy variable indicating that an MNE has employed another auditor (not Big 4) during the entire sample period 0 to 1
Drop Big 4 Dummy variable indicating that an MNE has at some point during the sample period stopped using a Big 4 auditor and switched to another
auditor
0 to 1
Take on Big 4 Dummy variable indicating that an MNE has switched from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor at some point during the sample period 0 to 1
Time Year of sample period 2005–2013
Industry Industry of the MNE’s main activity at the two-digit level of the NACE classiﬁcation 01–99
Country MNEs are located in one of the following 12 countries: Austria, Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, UK, Japan, Norway, New
Zealand, Sweden, US
ISO country codes
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binomial model in the Appendix A Table A1. The two sets of results are
qualitatively similar but the point estimates vary slightly.12 For all of
the models we control for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White stan-
dard errors.
It is important to note that we do not include MNEs in our data that
have no tax haven subsidiaries. This paper is concerned with the extent
of a MNEs tax haven network. In our view, the decision to expand the
ﬁrm’s network and complexity is much diﬀerent to the dichotomous
choice of whether to set up an oﬀshore subsidiary for the ﬁrst time as
we explain above. Jones and Temouri (2016) speciﬁcally address the
dichotomous choice. Indeed setting up a single tax haven subsidiary is a
trivial exercise and a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm is not needed to do so.
Instead, we argue that a Big 4 ﬁrm becomes more important when the
web of complexity of a ﬁrms oﬀshore tax haven network expands.
Furthermore, once a ﬁrm has experimented with oﬀshore tax shelters,
the likelihood of expansion increases and this is propagated by the tax
avoidance schemes that the Big 4 ﬁnancial services ﬁrms are well
known to oﬀer.
The model also takes into consideration that there are several ob-
servations of each ﬁrm across time in computing the error term. As a
result we have an unbalanced panel of nine years. The variation in the
number of tax haven subsidiaries used by MNEs across time allows us to
estimate a number of random poisson models to study the factors that
determine the extent to which MNEs change their tax haven presence.
The baseline model is as follows:
Tax Haven Subsidiariesit = β0 + β1 IATAit-1 + β2 VOCi + β3 Big4it-1 + δ
Xit–1 + timet + industryi + ε it (1)
where the dependent variable TaxHavenSubsidiariesit equals the
number of subsidiaries located in tax havens. The variable IATAit-1
measures the ratio intangible assets to total assets − our measure of a
MNEs ﬁrm speciﬁc advantage. The vector Xit-1 captures a number of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics which are seen as important in previous
research, such as ﬁrm size measured by turnover, ﬁrm age and the total
number of non-tax haven foreign subsidiaries as a measure of the extent
of an MNE’s internationalisation activities and experience. The dummy
variable VOCi distinguishes between LMEs equalling 1 and CMEs
equalling 0. The Big 4 dummy variable Big4it-1 captures PwC, KPMG, Ernst
and Young and Deloitte as a 1 and the all other auditors as 0. Hence β3 is
the coeﬃcient of primary interest as it quantiﬁes the impact of the
using a Big 4 ﬁrm on the number of tax haven subsidiaries. Finally, timet
and industryi are time and industry dummies, to account for business
cycle and industry speciﬁc eﬀects; ε it represents the error term.
3.5. Endogeneity
The estimation of β3 in Eq. (1) may be biased if there is an en-
dogenous relationship between the dependent variable, in this case the
number of tax haven subsidiaries, and the key explanatory variable, in
this case the use of a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm. It mainly arises when an
explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity in
this case may results from three diﬀerent sources, even when ac-
counting for the inclusion of lagged variables. The ﬁrst source could be
due to measurement error; the second source due to an uncontrolled
confounding variable; and the third factor due to a loop of causality
between the independent and dependent variables.
Endogeneity is diﬃcult to control for and is dependent on ﬁnding a
reliable instrument(s) in order to identify the causal eﬀect. In order to
control for endogeneity we adopt two approaches as robustness checks
to our baseline model. The ﬁrst approach adopts a two stage least
squares (2SLS) method applied to count data. Hence, we utilise an in-
strumental variables poisson regression. In order to operationalise this
methodology it is important to have an instrument that is correlated
with the use of a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm but is uncorrelated with the
number of tax haven subsidiaries an MNE decides to utilise. By using an
appropriate instrument it is possible to identify the causal impact of the
use of a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm on the incidence rate of tax haven use.
The instrument we utilise to do this is the level of a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed tangible
assets. Fixed tangible assets cannot easily be converted in to cash and
include various forms of plant and machinery. Hence ﬁxed assets are far
less transferable for tax purposes, compared with intangible assets and
employees. Therefore, the level of a ﬁrm’s tangible ﬁxed assets is un-
likely to be signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of tax haven
subsidiaries a ﬁrm uses, but is likely to be correlated with the use of a
Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm due to ﬁrm size and complexity.13 In these types
of models it is important to have more than one instrument in order to
test the instruments validity, such as the Hansen J test. Hence, we also
lag ﬁxed tangible assets by one period and include it as an instrument.14
The second approach we adopt estimates an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression but the dependent variable (number of tax haven
subsidiaries) is no longer measured by counting the number of tax
haven subsidiaries. Instead, we calculate the growth rate of tax haven
subsidiaries over time. Thus, we create a sub-sample from our data that
includes a set of MNEs that have never utilised a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm
and a set of MNEs that start to utilise a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm at some
point during the sample period. Hence, the following equation is esti-
mated in order to test hypotheses 2:
Tax Haven Growthit = α0 + γTakeon Big4 + δ
Xit–1 + timet + industryi + countryc uit (2)
Therefore, the parameter γ estimates the diﬀerence in the growth
rate of tax haven use for those ﬁrms that have taken on a Big 4 auditor
(TakeonBig4) compared to those ﬁrms who have never used a Big 4
auditor.
4. Results
We present our results in three parts. In the ﬁrst part, we report the
results of the baseline model (equation 1) using a number of poisson
speciﬁcations (negative binomial results are reported Table A1 in the
appendix). In the second part we report the results for the growth model
(Eq. (2)). Finally, in the third part we report the results of the instru-
mental variables poisson regression that attempts to control for en-
dogeneity.
4.1. Baseline model
Table 4 shows the results of ﬁve speciﬁcations that are variants of
Eq. (1). It is important to note that since these are random eﬀects
poisson models, the reported coeﬃcients should be interpreted as in-
cidence ratios. Overall, all the models work well and as expected. In
terms of FSAs and CSAs, all coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level (hence p-values are inﬁnitesimally small). All spe-
ciﬁcations show a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of around 1.2-1.4
12 We have experimented with log-linear models. The results are qualitatively similar
and are available on request.
13 Our data reveals that the correlation coeﬃcients between the Big 4 accountancy
ﬁrm dummy variable and tangible ﬁxed tangible assets is 0.42 and the correlation
coeﬃcient between the number of tax haven subsidiaries and tangible ﬁxed assets is
smaller at 0.19. Hence, in the absence of better instruments, we utilise tangible ﬁxed
assets as a ﬁrst attempt to control for an endogenous relationship between these two
speciﬁc variables in this context. Furthermore, the estimates of a probit model show that
tangible ﬁxed assets and the lag of tangible ﬁxed assets are strongly correlated positively
(and are statistically signiﬁcant) in relation with the use of a Big 4 auditor. The coeﬃcient
estimates and standard errors in brackets are 0.249*** (0.038) and 0.500** (0.039), and
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
14 The Hansen J test does not work for models that are exactly identiﬁed. Hence, we do
not report a model that uses tangible ﬁxed assets as a single instrument. Nevertheless, we
have estimated a model of this nature and the coeﬃcient estimates are stable. These
results are available on request.
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for the variable IATA, which we use to proxy the technological so-
phistication or FSA of an MNE. This conﬁrms past studies that supports
the view that the extent of an MNE’s network of tax haven subsidiaries
is positively dependent on the value of its intangible assets relative to
total assets. Furthermore, in terms of the VOC dummy we ﬁnd similar
evidence to support the view that MNEs from more LMEs have more
extensive tax haven networks in comparison to MNE from the CME.
This further corroborates research by Jones and Temouri (2016). The
coeﬃcient estimate for the VOC dummy suggests that MNEs from the
LMEs have an incident rate of tax haven utilisation 1.64-1.67 times
higher compared with their CME counterparts. Hence the results justify
the use of the VOC approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke, 2009) and
build upon the results of Jones and Temouri (2016).
Turning to the results that investigate empirically this paper’s key
theoretical contribution, we observe a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient for the Big 4 dummy in the range of 1.12 to 1.14. This suggests
that the incident rate or the extent to which MNEs utilise tax haven
subsidiaries is 1.12–1.14 times higher for those ﬁrms that utilise a Big 4
accountancy ﬁrm compared with MNEs that do not use a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm. Interestingly, the last column of Table 4 (speciﬁcation
5) shows variation across the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm, such that the
eﬀect is highest for PwC (1.204), followed by Deloitte (1.112), then
KPMG (1.104) and lastly Ernst and Young (1.075). All of these esti-
mates are relative to the base category of not using a Big 4 auditor.
Clearly therefore, we ﬁnd strong support for our ﬁrst hypothesis in that
there is a strong association/correlation between MNEs that utilise the
Big 4 as their auditor and the extent of an MNE’s tax haven network.
Indeed, it is important to be clear that this fact holds whilst controlling
for ﬁrm size and the degree of internationalisation as proxied for by
turnover and the number of non-tax haven subsidiaries. Furthermore,
our results also provide strong corroborating evidence that FSAs and
CSA have an impact as in Jones and Temouri (2016). Thus, we ﬁnd
evidence in favour of hypothesis 3 and 4. Intangible assets appear to be
a clear driver for tax haven FDI and the VOC dummy suggests that ﬁrms
from LMEs are likely to have a greater number of tax haven sub-
sidiaries.
As a robustness check we repeat speciﬁcations 1–5 using negative
binomial models. As can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix the
qualitative conclusions drawn from the poisson models continue to hold
− FSAs and CSAs are important and there is again a strong association
between using a Big 4 ﬁrm and the tax haven incidence rate.
Notwithstanding the variables that give evidence to our hypotheses,
it is also important to discuss the control variables. The estimates for
MNE size (i.e. log turnover) are positive and signiﬁcant. The literature
Table 4
Random-eﬀects poisson analysis of the number of tax haven subsidiaries.
Dependent variable: No. of THS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log turnover 1.069*** 1.063*** 1.068*** 1.063*** 1.063***
(S.E) (0.00329) (0.00334) (0.00325) (0.00330) (0.00330)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002***
(S.E) (0.000245) (0.000244) (0.000245) (0.000244) (0.000244)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IATA 1.419*** 1.412*** 1.241*** 1.239*** 1.246***
(S.E) (0.0593) (0.0588) (0.0523) (0.0521) (0.0525)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of non-THS 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003***
(S.E) (5.05e-05) (5.04e-05) (5.04e-05) (5.03e-05) (5.07e-05)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Big 4 1.149*** 1.123***
(S.E) (0.0198) (0.0192)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000
VOC 1.672*** 1.650*** 1.642***
(S.E) (0.0418) (0.0411) (0.0410)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
PWC 1.204***
(S.E) (0.0254)
(P-value) 0.000
EY 1.075***
(S.E) (0.0220)
(P-value) 0.000
KPMG 1.104***
(S.E) (0.0252)
(P-value) 0.000
Deloitte 1.112***
(S.E) (0.0273)
(P-value) 0.000
Constant 1.071 1.082 0.656** 0.633*** 0.664**
(S.E) (0.205) (0.206) (0.0131) (0.125) (0.124)
(P-value) 0.719 0.679 0.025 0.032 0.029
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Log likelihood −49504.307 −49472.096 −49299.635 −49276.592 −49259.466
Wald chi2 7481.51 7599.64 8149.16 8240.96 8258.75
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test 1.1e + 05 1.0e + 05 1.0e + 05 9.9e + 04 9.9e + 04
Prob> chi-bar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 24,781 24,781 24,781 24,781 24,781
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period.
The reported coeﬃcients are incidence rate ratios.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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consistently ﬁnds evidence that larger US ﬁrms are more likely to have
a propensity to use tax haven subsidiaries. We also include a variable
that measures the total number of foreign subsidiaries, as a measure of
the extent of an MNE’s internationalisation activities and experience,
and the results indicate that the more international the MNE is, the
greater the extent to which they utilise tax haven subsidiaries. An ad-
ditional insight also suggests that older more experienced MNEs are
also more likely to manage larger tax haven networks.
Building on these results, Table 5 shows an extension of the speci-
ﬁcations outlined above. Again we estimate a random eﬀects poisson
model (negative binomial reported in Table A2 in the Appendix A) but
this time we investigate the incidence rate of tax haven use if a ﬁrm
takes on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm at some point over the sample period.
To do this we introduce three dummy variables: (1) use a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm for the whole time period; (2) take on a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm during the time period investigated; and (3) drop a Big
4 accountancy ﬁrm during the time period and replace it with a non-Big
4 auditor. These three dummies are measured against the baseline ca-
tegory of not using a Big 4 auditor during the time period studied.
As can be seen in Table 5, ﬁrms that use a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm
throughout the sample have an incident rate of tax haven use 1.5 times
higher than those ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 auditor at all. More
importantly, however, is that for those ﬁrms that take on a Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm during the sample period, the incidence rate is 1.08
time higher (1.2 times higher using the negative binomial speciﬁcation
in Table A2). Hence there appears to be a causal link between taking on
a Big 4 auditor and the incident rate of tax haven use. Interestingly, for
those ﬁrms that drop a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm the incidence rate is
insigniﬁcant in comparison to those ﬁrms who have never used a Big 4
auditor (the base category. Furthermore, in this speciﬁcation, we again
ﬁnd evidence that intangibles and LMEs are key drivers of tax haven
FDI as measured by the number of tax haven subsidiaries.15
4.2. Instrumental variables poisson model
Table 6 reports the results for the poisson model where we use an
instrumental variables estimator to attempt to control for endogeneity
between the use of the Big 4 and the incident rate of tax haven use. The
VOC coeﬃcient estimate is positive and signiﬁcant and suggests that
liberal market MNEs have an incident rate 1.28 times higher than MNEs
from CMEs. Hence there is clear support for hypothesis 4. Interestingly,
the coeﬃcient for IATA is much smaller than previous estimates at
0.76. This suggests that intangibles are less important in terms of the
size of a ﬁrm’s tax haven network. This is an intriguing ﬁnding and
might be explained due to the fact that it is possible for a ﬁrm to locate
(artiﬁcially) a signiﬁcant amount of its intangible assets in a small
number of tax haven locations. This ﬁnding certainly warrants further
investigating in future research but does run counter to our other es-
timates for intangible assets to total assets.
In terms of the impact of the Big 4, the coeﬃcient estimate is very
large at 5.673 and is statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the use
of a Big 4 auditor has an incidence rate 5.6 times higher compared to
Table 5
Random Eﬀects Poisson analysis of staying versus switching auditors.
Dependent variable: No. of THS (1)
Log turnover 1.048***
(S.E) (0.00342)
(P-value) 0.000
Age 1.001***
(S.E) (0.000245)
(P-value) 0.000
IATA 1.232***
(S.E) (0.0519)
(P-value) 0.000
No. of non-THS 1.003***
(S.E) (5.02e-05)
(P-value) 0.000
VOC 1.523***
(S.E) (0.0390)
(P-value) 0.000
Always Big 4 1.519***
(S.E) (0.0441)
(P-value) 0.000
Drop Big 4 0.972
(S.E) (0.0546)
(P-value) 0.609
Take on Big 4 1.085*
(S.E) (0.0475)
(P-value) 0.061
Constant 0.630***
(S.E) (0.0128)
(P-value) 0.167
Industry Dummies YES
Time Dummies YES
Log likelihood −49184.668
Wald chi2 8591.05
Prob> chi2 0.000
LR test 9.9e + 04
Prob> chi-bar2 0.000
Observations 24,781
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period.
All speciﬁcations include a full set of year and industry dummies.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The reported coeﬃcients are incidence rate ratios.
Table 6
Instrumental Variables Poisson Regression.
Dependent variable: No. of THS
Instrument for Big 4 dummy: Tangible ﬁxed assets (1)
Log turnover 0.209**
(S.E) (0.0121)
(P-value) 0.006
Age 0.999**
(S.E) (0.0002)
(P-value) 0.035
IATA 0.765***
(S.E) (0.0460)
(P-value) 0.000
No. of non-THS 1.007***
(S.E) (0.0002)
(P-value) 0.000
VOC 1.283***
(S.E) (0.0358)
(P-value) 0.000
Big 4 5.6730***
(S.E) (0.9721)
(P-value) 0.000
Constant 1.067
(S.E) (0.1820)
(P-value) 0.706
Industry Dummies YES
Time Dummies YES
Hansen J Test 1.559
P-value 0.211
Observations 20,908
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period.
All speciﬁcations include a full set of year and industry and country dummies.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
The reported coeﬃcients are incidence rate ratios.
The number of observations falls compared to the baseline models in Table 3 due to fewer
observations for two instruments, namely tangible ﬁxed assets and tangible ﬁxed assets
lagged
one period.
15 We have also estimated the models in Table 5 separately for manufacturing ﬁrms,
services ﬁrms and high knowledge-intensive ﬁrms to determine whether there is het-
erogeneity. Qualitatively, the results are similar to those in Table 5. However, there is
some evidence that the impact of the Big 4 is stronger for manufacturing ﬁrms comparted
to services ﬁrms. These results are available on request.
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those ﬁrms who do not use a Big 4 auditor. This magnitude is much
higher compared with the results reported above and should be inter-
preted with caution. Nevertheless, the result does again indicate that
there is a strong positive relationship between the use of a Big 4 auditor
and the incidence rate of tax haven use. It is also important to note that
the Hansen J test is not signiﬁcant, with one degree of freedom, as we
have two instruments (tangible assets and tangible assets lagged one
period). Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model is
correctly speciﬁed, indicating that the instruments are valid.
4.3. Growth rate model
Table 7 sheds more light on causality by estimating an OLS re-
gression with the dependent variable equal to the growth rate in tax
haven subsidiaries and again includes a dummy variable equal to 1 if an
MNE takes on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm at some point over the time
period. It is important to note that for this regression the sample only
includes ﬁrms that take on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm and those MNEs
that do not use a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm at all; hence the sample size is
smaller. The reason for including only these two groups is to isolate the
eﬀect of the Big 4 compared with not using them at all. In total there are
2034 ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm and 590 ﬁrms that
take on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm to ﬁle their accounts within the
sample period.
The results provide strong support for hypothesis 2 and suggest that
the growth rate of tax haven subsidiaries is 2.9 percent higher for those
MNEs that take on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm to ﬁle their accounts
compared to those ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 auditor at all.
Furthermore, there is also evidence for hypothesis 3 in that a higher
ratio of intangibles to total assets drives the growth rate in tax haven
subsidiaries.
5. Discussion
The results of this paper show that the use of a Big 4 auditor, in
addition to both FSAs and CSAs, has an important impact on the extent
to which MNEs utilise tax havens to avoid corporate taxation across
their network of overseas subsidiaries. But given this important ﬁnding,
what are the implications? On the one hand, tax avoidance erodes the
corporate tax base so that there are fewer resources available to fund
public goods. On the other hand, a lower tax bill − made possible by
the use of tax havens − gives MNEs a competitive advantage; so it is
perhaps unsurprising that there are strong incentives for managers to
utilise the various loopholes available to avoid tax. Indeed, if ﬁrms do
not minimise their eﬀective tax rate they may be at a disadvantage
relative to their rivals. Why would ﬁrms pay tax if legally they do not
have to? What follows is a general discussion of the current policy
landscape and how our ﬁndings may have an impact upon policy ma-
kers, managers and the Big 4 themselves. Indeed, the actions of policy
makers in the area of international tax reform may have a signiﬁcant
impact on the decisions corporate executives make in terms of the use
of tax havens and their relationship with the Big 4.
5.1. Implications for policy makers
Policy makers have been struggling over the issue of tax havens for
some time. Politicians from the right of the political spectrum, who
favour low taxes in general, tend to view tax havens more favourably in
the sense that they create competition that stops opportunistic ﬁnance
ministers from levying large tax rates on corporate proﬁts.
Furthermore, the tax must be borne by someone and if it is capital that
bears the majority of the burden then high corporate taxes and un-
generous allowances may deter investment. In contrast, politicians from
the left of the political spectrum would argue that it is unfair that
mobile capital is allowed to avoid taxation and hence shift the burden
of funds for public and merit goods on to immobile factors of produc-
tion, that is, low-skilled labour. Indeed, there has recently been a
growing awareness of the increasing share of proﬁt (or capital) as a
proportion of GDP in the US as well as other OECD economies (Piketty,
2013). The use of tax havens is thus seen as enhancing this trend re-
sulting in higher inequality of income and wealth (Zucman, 2015).
Since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the expansion in OECD public debt
has put signiﬁcant pressure on OECD public ﬁnances. Austerity mea-
sures aimed at reducing budget deﬁcits has, rightly or wrongly, meant
tax increases and at the same time spending cuts. Hence, it is not sur-
prising that citizens have taken such a dim view of MNEs avoiding
corporate tax across the OECD, nor that policy makers have acted. The
OECD BEPS initiative, carried out over 2013–2015 at the behest of the
G20 and G8 groups of countries, represented the single biggest inter-
national collaboration on tax rules for decades. While many of the
measures were watered down in negotiations and their prospects for
success is increasingly questioned (BMG, 2015), the political consensus
around the single aim of BEPS remains strong: to reduce the extent of
misalignment between proﬁts and the location of the underlying, real
economic activity.
History may judge the BEPS initiative as the last great defence of the
separate accounting approach, and of the OECD as the keeper of in-
ternational tax rules. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant contribution will turn
out to be the introduction of country-by-country reporting for MNEs,
based on the longstanding proposal of the Tax Justice Network. This
information provides the basis for consistent, comprehensive tracking
of proﬁt misalignment which up to now has not been possible. If it is
required to be made public each year, as civil society organisations
have demanded, the performance of tax authorities as well as MNEs will
be laid bare − along with the distorting eﬀect of the major corporate
tax havens. That transparency may ultimately provide the account-
ability necessary to rein in the most egregious proﬁt-shifting− both by
empowering tax authorities, and by ensuring public pressure for pro-
gress.
If policy makers consider tax haven use by MNEs a revenue risk; and
if they consider the relationship between tax haven use and Big 4 ac-
countancy ﬁrm to be ﬁrmly established; then it follows that prudent risk
Table 7
Ordinary least squares analysis on the growth of tax haven subsidiaries.
Dependent variable: Growth in THS (1)
Log turnover 0.539*
(S.E) (0.325)
(P-value) 0.098
Age 0.056**
(S.E) (0.028)
(P-value) 0.043
IATA 2.927
(S.E) (3.283)
(P-value) 0.373
No. of non-THS 0.015
(S.E) (0.026)
(P-value) 0.580
Take on Big 4 2.900**
(S.E) (1.365)
(P-value) 0.034
Constant −16.689***
(S.E) (4.533)
(P-value) 0.000
Industry Dummies YES
Time Dummies YES
Country Dummies YES
F test 2.21
Prob> F 0.000
R2 0.021
Observations 9276
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period.
All speciﬁcations include a full set of year, industry and country dummies.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Coeﬃcients are shown as marginal eﬀects.
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management will entail a more cautious approach to the Big 4 and their
clients. That could involve tax authorities applying a diﬀerential cate-
gorisation of client risk, depending on the auditor − which would
provide a strong business incentive for the Big 4 to demonstrate that
they no longer promote tax haven structures.
Policy makers could also consider speciﬁc transparency require-
ments for the Big 4 in light of their market power and also their political
inﬂuence (see e.g. Shah, 2015). This could include, for example, more
consistent annual reporting on the nature of diﬀerent income streams;
as well as closer regulation of auditor-provided tax services.
The major transparency requirement, however, remains the pub-
lication of country-by-country reporting (CBCR) by MNEs. As well as
valuable to reduce the risks of tax avoidance by MNEs, the im-
plementation of public CBCR would mean that the demand for tax
avoidance schemes provided by the Big 4 would in all likelihood fall.
Public CBCR would reveal not only which MNEs are most aggressive in
shifting proﬁts, and which jurisdictions are most important in receiving
shifted proﬁts − it would also show the relative performance of the
clients of each of the Big 4. It would, for example, have revealed the
central role of PwC in clients’ proﬁt-shifting to Luxembourg, long before
it reached the dramatic scale shown in the leaks of the Luxembourg tax
rulings.
Public CBCR could thus have the added beneﬁt of indirectly reg-
ulating the power of the Big 4–instead of a more direct approach, such
as strict anti-trust measures to require their break-up. Clearly, splitting
up these ﬁrms would have to be implemented on a global scale and the
legal costs would be substantial. Given this, we would argue the in-
direct approach of CBCR would be a signiﬁcant step in the right di-
rection. With the introduction of the OECD standard, MNEs already face
all the compliance costs − most of which take the form, of course, of
payments to the Big 4. Making the data public, rather than privately
available to (some) tax authorities (see Knobel & Cobham, 2016), would
ensure the full beneﬁts of accountability − and importantly, the ac-
countability of the Big 4 as well as their clients.
In addition, the making public of tax rulings and advance pricing
agreements would ensure transparency about what are eﬀectively in-
dividual contracts that determine the distribution of funds between the
public ﬁscal authority and private actors. As with the growing move-
ment towards ‘Open Contracting’ − the publication of all signiﬁcant
public contracts − the same logic applies here. Public funds should be
subject to public scrutiny, and this should override any claim of com-
mercial conﬁdentiality.
5.2. Implications for management
In terms of strategic management, it is not surprising that MNEs
decide to undertake tax avoidance strategies to boost net proﬁts. Some
argue that it is the ﬁduciary duty of executives to maximise shareholder
value and hence boost competitive advantage. Dissenting legal opinion
contests this (e.g. Farrer & Co., 2013). Perhaps more importantly, evi-
dence has emerged that shareholders do not in fact beneﬁt from lower
eﬀective tax rates. Recent research (Brooks, Godfrey, Hillenbrand and.
Money, 2016) suggests that for UK-listed ﬁrms at least, a lower eﬀective
tax rate does not translate into higher shareholder returns but does
expose shareholders to greater risk. A quite diﬀerent analysis ﬁnds that
US banks impose higher interest rates and harsher non-interest terms on
ﬁrms with a greater degree of tax avoidance − indicating that banks
too perceive higher associated risks (Hasan, Hoi, Wu and Zhang, 2014).
Internalisation theory may explain why ﬁrms would undertake this
type of activity. Nevertheless, why some ﬁrms shy away from this type
of behaviour is somewhat unknown. Indeed, future research into this
issue would shed light as to the factors that act as deterrents. Needless
to say, a few potential factors are worth mentioning here as they may be
the key things that inﬂuence executives over strategy− and the role of
greater transparency is clearly important.
The ﬁrst factor is whether an MNE’s activity of this type will be
detected by the tax authorities. Clearly many of the tax avoidance
schemes that ﬁrms use have risks associated with them. If it is found
that ﬁrms are not tax compliant then they may face heavy ﬁnes which
can be backdated. In late December 2016, Apple agreed to pay £234
million to settle a tax dispute with the Italian authorities. This type of
case, which is just one example of many, may detract from a ﬁrm’s core
competencies and reduce a ﬁrm’s competitive advantage. Executives
therefore have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of tax avoidance schemes
should they wish to undertake tax avoidance to boost proﬁtability.
The second factor is the role of public relations and more widely
social responsibility. This factor may weigh more heavily for some ﬁrms
compared to others. For example, it was widely reported that the coﬀee
chain Starbucks paid a negligible amount of corporate income tax in the
UK during its ﬁrst 14 years. Then, due to much bad publicity, the
company paid a tax bill in 2015 of £8.1 million (Davies, 2015). Clearly
Starbucks executives saw that the bad PR might damage the ﬁrm’s
brand as other coﬀee chains were not receiving similar attention. In
contrast, Google has not altered its corporate structure in terms of its
tax aﬀairs. It might be that strategy in this domain diﬀers for high-street
retailers compared with ﬁrms that have a digital platform. Indeed, there
is evidence that greater public scrutiny of companies’ tax aﬀairs by civil
society groups is associated with a reduction in the use of tax havens,
and a reduction in tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hooper, &Wilde, 2016).
Perhaps this scrutiny has more of an impact on ﬁrms that have a greater
physical presence or more obviously local competition.
Finally, the third factor is policy uncertainty. Tax executives may be
deterred by tax avoidance schemes if they feel that the policy en-
vironment is likely to change in the near future or indeed if it is volatile.
Given the hostility via civil society to the use of tax havens by MNEs
across the OECD it does appear that policy makers are starting to take
action, so a more cautious approach to these schemes may be in order.
5.3. Implications for the Big 4
The results of this paper appear to corroborate much of the recent
media attention that has shown a signiﬁcant link between the tax
avoidance activities of MNEs and the role of the Big 4 accountancy
ﬁrms. It is, however, not clear that this ﬁnding has major implications
for the ﬁrms themselves− unless there is a substantial growth in public
and policymaker awareness.
The Big 4 are interesting due to their organisational form. In con-
trast to many MNEs, the Big 4 would argue that they are not in them-
selves single ﬁrms; rather they are a network of separate legal entities
structured to comply with the regulatory environment of the jurisdic-
tion to which they are located. For instance, in the UK they are regis-
tered as Limited Liability Partnerships which allows reduced risk to
personal wealth from creditors’ claims.
Nevertheless, the Big 4 have huge power and inﬂuence as global
brands. It is true that the links between KPMG Ireland and KPMG UK,
for example, may be relatively weak compared to those between the UK
and Irish operations of Google (Alphabet Inc.). Based on reputation,
however, the links are hugely important. The Enron scandal only had
direct relevance for a small part of Arthur Andersen’s global network,
but was suﬃcient to destroy it in its entirety. And the 2015 arrest on tax
evasion charges of KPMG Ireland’s four most senior staﬀ members in
Belfast, undoubtedly caused a serious reputational issue for KPMG
elsewhere. Similarly, not every PwC entity was involved in the pro-
motion of Luxembourg tax rulings exposed in the ‘LuxLeaks’, and only
one was criticised by UK parliamentarians for having misled them
about the ‘mass marketing’ of avoidance schemes (Public Accounts
Committee, 2015); but undoubtedly all will have felt some impact.
According to Shah (2015), in a case study of KPMG in the UK, the
Big 4 engages systematically in regulatory arbitrage − deﬁned in this
context as where ‘organisations or professionals use their knowledge of
the regulations, legislation and administrative procedures to help their
clients escape the substance of those rules and thereby beneﬁt
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commercially’. The Big 4, on a global scale appear to help MNEs to
escape the regulatory limits and controls in speciﬁc nation states in a
similar manner to that pointed out by Buckley et al. (2015). This,
however, runs counter to their global license to audit ﬁrms and ensure
their accountability (Shah (2015)).
According to Hanlon (1994), Zeﬀ (2003) and Sikka (2008) the
practice of accounting has changed in recent decades from the image of
a respected profession focusing on quality, ethics and independent as-
surance to a lucrative market in advisory and consultancy service
(Shah, 2015). This commercialisation is vast and the consultancy
market has outgrown the traditional audit market that the Big 4 serve.
This means that an ‘overwhelming culture and values related to proﬁt
maximisation, and serving the client, whatever their needs’ (Shah,
2015) has developed. Indeed, given the size of this market, it is unlikely
that the Big 4 will shy away from it. They would argue that what they
do is within the law, and any responsibility for change lies with the
policymakers who set those laws.
There is, however, another side to the Big 4. Rather than neutrally
exploiting existing laws, the Big 4 have become important players in
law-making. They are an important source of high-level expertise. This
means they tend to be well represented in national policymaking, which
risks important conﬂicts of interest. For example, the Big 4 were heavily
criticised by the UK Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (2013) for
the use of expertise gathered from seconding staﬀ to government for the
creation of new policy. The Committee’s report (2013, p.10) noted that
they were ‘very concerned by the way that the four ﬁrms appear to use
their insider knowledge of legislation to sell clients advice on how to
use those rules to pay less tax.’ The Big 4, along with international law
ﬁrms, also tend to be highly represented in international tax policy
processes (see e.g. Christensen, 2015, on the OECD BEPS process).
In addition, there is evidence of Big 4 ﬁrms not only making use of
existing opportunities for inﬂuence, and for regulatory arbitrage, but of
their actively lobbying to create major new ones. The Big 4′s presence
in many small ﬁnancial centres around the world, where this expertise
may be especially important in informing policymakers’ decisions, has
been increasingly well documented (see Murphy, 2012). In addition,
there are clear cases of Big 4 involvement in lobbying for favourable
policy changes. Cousins et al. (2004) document how Ernst & Young and
Price Waterhouse (as they then were) were able to get a Bill they had
written (after spending more than £1 million) ‘fast tracked’ through the
Jersey legislature in 1995–1996. The Bill created Limited Liability
Partnerships, which oﬀered very great protection to (for example) ac-
counting partners, but without the full accounting transparency which
had historically been the quid pro quo for limited liability. This was then
used, with the threat of relocation, to lobby for the UK’s adoption of a
similar law. That aim was achieved in 2000, and subsequently made use
of by all Big 4 ﬁrms.
It seems unlikely that the current state of play will change sig-
niﬁcantly even though policy makers, across the globe, appear to be
taking tax avoidance more seriously. There seems little appetite to risk
reducing the ﬁrms to a big three only through regulatory action. Rightly
or wrongly, the Big 4 also continue to maintain a reputation, by and
large, as objective, technical experts on tax matters. Absent a systematic
global approach to regulating the activities of the Big 4, in terms of the
tax avoidance schemes and tax haven usage promoted to clients, we
would expect business as usual. Currently only the advent of public
country-by-country reporting, which would allow ongoing monitoring
of the Big 4′s role in the proﬁt misalignment of client multinationals,
oﬀers the prospect of greater accountability and behavioural change.
6. Conclusion
Globalisation has vastly expanded the opportunities for MNEs to
build complex international value chains and locate subsidiaries across
the world to add value. These opportunities include operating sub-
sidiaries for tax purposes. We have built on recent IB theory (see
Jones & Temouri, 2016) and extended the FSA/CSA framework and the
varieties of capitalism framework to the extent of tax haven use in
contrast to the dichotomous choice approach seen in the existing lit-
erature. It is abundantly clear that ﬁrms with strong FSAs in terms of
intangible assets appear to locate a number of subsidiaries in oﬀshore
tax havens. Further, MNEs form more LMEs have a higher degree of tax
haven complexity compared to their CME peers. The ‘Double Irish with
a Dutch Sandwich’ scheme shown above is just the tip of the iceberg.
Tax haven complexity is part and parcel of the biggest MNEs tax
planning structures and the Big 4 play a prominent part in the man-
agement and audit of these complex networks.
Our results suggest that the role of the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrms is far
from insigniﬁcant. In aggregate, MNEs that use a Big 4 accountancy
ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly higher tax haven incident rate compared to
those ﬁrms that do not use a Big 4 auditor. Hence this paper demon-
strates clear evidence of a strong correlation between tax haven use and
the use of the Big 4. In addition, we also provide evidence of causation
− we ﬁnd that taking on a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm is associated with at
least a 2.9 percent higher growth rate in the number of tax haven
subsidiaries over the period studied compared to those ﬁrms that do not
use a Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm.
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst cross-country, ﬁrm-level study
that investigates the relationship between Big 4 use and the extent to
which MNEs utilise tax haven subsidiaries. Nevertheless, our research
does have some limitations that future researchers may be able to ad-
dress. Firstly, our data does not speciﬁcally identify the overall mone-
tary value of assets booked in to tax haven subsidiaries. Hence our
dependent variable is simply based on a count. It is possible that the
growing hostility to the use of tax havens by civil society may in-
centivise MNEs to reduce the number of tax haven subsidiaries but
continue to use the ones that remain open more intensively. Future
research may shed light on this, by looking at smaller samples, or by
taking advantage of other data sources and adopting a case based
methodology.
A related data issue is the fact that Orbis data is collected mostly
from national corporate registries, and is comprehensive only to the
extent that the data exists in these registries in the ﬁrst place. With
respect to subsidiaries in tax havens, there could be gaps in coverage
which are not included in Orbis. Therefore, we would argue that our
observations on tax haven subsidiaries is quite conservative and it is fair
to say that the actual ﬁgures may well be higher; hence our results may
underestimate the impact of the Big 4. Indeed, Clausing, Kleinbard,
Matheson, and Board (2016) highlights the relatively under-reported
coverage of tax haven subsidiaries in particular. More consistent re-
cording of the overseas subsidiaries owned by MNEs would be a posi-
tive step and useful in future research. Furthermore, if the adoption of
country-by-country reporting leads to greater transparency, it will be
easier for researchers to quantify the use of tax havens by MNEs.
Nevertheless, the use of ORBIS for this type of research is still a major
contribution. Even with the current changes to OECD FDI data (i.e. the
acknowledgement that pass-through entities are of increasing im-
portance) there is still limited information on the types of oﬀshore
activity really taking place. Hence this paper does go some way to
addressing this shortfall.
Secondly, we do not speciﬁcally have information as to whether the
MNEs included in our sample utilise the Big 4 accountancy ﬁrm for tax
purposes. Therefore, our interpretation is somewhat more nuanced in
that it is the accountancy ﬁrms that are content to sign oﬀ an MNE’s
accounts given that they have complex international structures that
may include subsidiaries for tax avoidance. We do acknowledge that
there are data available on a ﬁrm’s non-audit expenses but given the
magnitude of this study it would be diﬃcult to match this information
for the whole sample, particularly in identifying which non-audit ser-
vices are being utilised. Nevertheless, there is a literature (see
Maydew& Shackelford, 2005) that clearly indicates that the use of a Big
4 accountancy ﬁrm is strongly correlated with using them for tax
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advice, even though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has curtailed this activity
somewhat in the US. Indeed, there is still nothing in the US, for ex-
ample, that stops a ﬁrm from utilising the same ﬁnancial services ﬁrm
for its tax advice as well as its audit. It is up to ﬁrms to self-regulate
themselves via the audit committee to ensure there is no conﬂict of
interest. How well ﬁrms implement these regulations is largely un-
known. Future research may be able to delve deeper into this issue if it
is possible to identify the payments made by clients to the Big 4 for tax
purposes.
This paper opens up a new line of enquiry in terms of research that
investigates the role of tax havens in international business and man-
agement in general. There are a number of interesting questions that
the literature is silent on. For example, what is the impact of tax haven
use on ﬁrm performance in terms of proﬁtability and/or eﬃciency
gains? Do family owned ﬁrms utilise tax havens to a greater or lesser
extent than non-family ﬁrms? Why is it that some ﬁrms within CMEs
such as Germany utilise them but others do not? Could this be linked to
corporate governance? Lastly, in our view there is a signiﬁcant lack of
survey evidence in this area. It would be a fascinating area of research
for scholars to speak to corporate executives to identify views about this
type of activity and discuss how managers set strategy over these issues
and how they may respond to the growing pressure by policy makers to
curtail tax avoidance.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Random eﬀects negative binomial analysis of the number of tax haven subsidiaries.
Dependent variable: No. of THS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Turnover 1.039*** 1.034*** 1.052*** 1.047*** 1.047***
(S.E) (0.00375) (0.00381) (0.00360) (0.00367) (0.00367)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001***
(S.E) (0.000273) (0.000273) (0.000259) (0.000258) (0.000258)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IATA 1.222*** 1.223*** 1.214*** 1.217*** 1.218***
(S.E) (0.0574) (0.0573) (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0575)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of non-THS 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003***
(S.E) (5.39e-05) (5.38e-05) (5.41e-05) (5.40e-05) (5.41e-05)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Big 4 1.105*** 1.124***
(S.E) (0.0208) (0.0211)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000
VOC 1.498*** 1.479*** 1.478***
(S.E) (0.0376) (0.0371) (0.0370)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
PWC 1.161***
(S.E) (0.0278)
(P-value) 0.000
EY 1.115***
(S.E) (0.0265)
(P-value) 0.000
KPMG 1.109***
(S.E) (0.0280)
(P-value) 0.000
Deloitte 1.094***
(S.E) (0.0299)
(P-value) 0.000
Constant 6.156*** 6.497*** 5.362*** 5.479*** 5.460***
(S.E) (1.243) (1.310) (1.026) (1.045) (1.042)
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Log likelihood −48520.509 −48506.544 −48639.504 −48620.327 −48617.592
Wald chi2 5727.95 5786.46 5331.52 5408.12 5418.65
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test 2.9e + 04 2.9e + 04 3.0e + 04 3.0e + 04 3.0e + 04
Prob> chi-bar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 24,781 24,781 24,781 24,781 24,781
Notes: All explanatory variables are lagged one period.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The reported coeﬃcients are incidence rate ratios.
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